

Message Text

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PARM
SUBJ: HIGHLIGHTS, POST-PLENARY CONVERSATIONS,
JUNE 14, 1977 (SALT TWO-1224)

1. (LTC JOHNSON-LTC JOURAVLEV, A-1578)

SS-16/SS-20

MEMCON IS QUOTED IN ITES ENTIRETY:

QUOTE

LTCOL JOURAVLEV BEGAN BY DISCUSSING HIS UNDERSTANDING OF
AMBASSADOR EARLE'S STATEMENT ON DUAL-CAPABLE LAUNCHERS AND, IN
PARTICULAR, THE PROBLEM OF THE SS-20 LAUNCHER. JOURAVLEV WAS
ACCURATE, EXCEPT HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE U.S. SAID THE
SS-16 MISSILE HAD BEEN DEPLOYED WITH THE SS-20 LAUNCHER. I
CORRECTED JOURAVLEV INDICATING THAT THE U.S. BELIEVED THAT THE
LAUNCHER OF THE SS-20 IRBM WAS ALSO CAPABLE OF LAUNCHING THE
SS-16 ICBM, AND THAT THE U.S. MADE NO STATEMENT AS TO WHETHER THE
SS-16 WAS DEPLOYED WITH THE SS-20 LAUNCHER. JOURAVLEV SAID THAT
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HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO SAY THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT
DEPLOY A LAUNCHER CAPABLE OF LAUNCHING TWO DIFFERENT MISSILES, AND
THAT THEY INDEED HAD NOT AND WOULD NOT DO SO. HE ASKED FOR MY
AGREEMENT THAT THE SS-16 AND SS-20 WERE DIFFERENT MISSILES, WHICH
I GAVE. HE SAID AS SOMEONE FAMILIAR WITH THE TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF
MISSILES, I WOULD UNDERSTAND THAT THERE WERE EQUIPMENT DIFFERENCES
WHICH WOULD PRECLUDE A LAUNCHER FOR ONE MISSILE FROM LAUNCHING

A DIFFERENT MISSILE. I ASKED HIM WHAT HE MEANT BY EQUIPMENT DIFFERENCES. HE REPLIED THAT MISSILES MUST BE PROGRAMMED WITH INFORMATION SUCH AS FLIGHT PROFILE, TRAJECTORY AND TARGETING, AND THE LAUNCHER WE WERE DISCUSSING WAS NOT CAPABLE OF PROVIDING SUCH PROGRAMMING FOR THE SS-16 MISSILE.

JOURAVLEV INTRODUCED A DISCUSSION OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE SS-16 WITH THE SS-20 LAUNCHER BY ASKING ME IF THE FACTS THAT LED TO OUR CONCLUSION WERE CURRENT, OR WERE WE ADDRESSING A FUTURE SITUATION. I TOLD JOURAVLEV THAT THE FACTS WHICH SUBSTANTIATE THE U.S. POSITION WERE BASED ON ASSOCIATIONS WHICH ARE CURRENTLY ESTABLISHED. JOURAVLEV ASKED IF WE HAD SEEN THE SS-16 LAUNCHED FROM THE SS-20 LAUNCHER. I ADVISED JOURAVLEV THAT I WOULD NOT ENTER INTO A DISCUSSION OF MEANS AND METHODS, BUT THAT THE ASSOCIATION HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED DURING THE DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING PHASE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CONCEPTS CONTAINED IN THE AGREED STATEMENT TO ARTICLE II, PARAGRAPH 1. I POINTED OUT THAT THE DELEGATIONS WERE WORKING HARD TO DETERMINE THE DEGREE OF UNDERSTANDING WE HAVE REGARDING THESE CONCEPTS. I REFERRED TO THE "TYPE RULE" AND THE PHRASES "CONTAINED OR LAUNCHED" AND "FACTS WHICH COULD SUPPORT."

JOURAVLEV PROPOSED THAT EVEN THOUGH WE HAD ASSOCIATED THE SS-16 WITH THE SS-20 LAUNCHER DURING THE TESTING PHASE, IF SS-16S WERE NOT OBSERVED DEPLOYED WITH THE SS-20 LAUNCHER THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEM. I DREW A PICTURE OF A MOBILE LAUNCHER (A STRAIGHT LINE WITH WHEELS) AND INDICATED THAT BOTH THE SS-16 AND SS-20 HAD BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH THAT LAUNCHER. I BOUNDED THE PICTURE WITH A LINE AND THE WORDS "DEVELOP AND TEST" AND THEN MOVED THE LAUNCHER ACROSS THE LINE TO AN AREA WHICH I LABELED
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"DEPLOYED". I INDICATED THAT IF THE LAUNCHER WERE DEPLOYED WITH ONLY THE SS-20 IT WOULD STILL COUNT, BECAUSE IT HAD THE CAPABILITY TO LAUNCH THE SS-16.

JOURAVLEV CROSSED OUT THE ASSOCIATION OF THE SS-16 WITH THE SS-20 LAUNCHER I HAD DRAWN IN THE "DEVELOP AND TEST" AREA, DREW A SECOND MOBILE LAUNCHER FOR THE SS-16 AND SAID THERE ARE TWO LAUNCHERS; THE SS-16 LAUNCHER CANNOT LAUNCH THE SS-20, THE SS-20 LAUNCHER CANNOT LAUNCH THE SS-16. AS WITH HIS EXPLANATION OF EQUIPMENT DIFFERENCES, I EXPLAINED THAT SUCH A SITUATION WAS ENTIRELY POSSIBLE, BUT THAT THE U.S. HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO MAKE THE DISTINCTION THAT THE SS-20 LAUNCHER COULD NOT LAUNCH THE SS-16. I ADDED, AS AMBASSADOR EARLE HAD STATED, THAT THE U.S. WOULD BE WILLING TO CONSIDER ANY VERIFIABLE ARRANGEMENTS THE SOVIETS WOULD UNDERTAKE TO ENABLE US TO MAKE THIS DETERMINATION.

JOURAVLEV ASKED ME TWICE DURING THE PERIOD OF OUR CONVERSATION WHAT ARRANGEMENTS THE U.S. WOULD PROPOSE. I RESPONDED THAT THE SS-20 AND THE SS-16 WERE SOVIET WEAPON SYSTEMS AND THEY WERE THE APPROPRIATE SIDE TO PROPOSE ARRANGEMENTS TO CORRECT THE

PROBLEM.

DURING THE COURSE OF THE CONVERSATION, I ALSO REFERRED TO THE AGREED STATEMENT TO ARTICLE II.1, TO ARTICLE III.5, AND TO ARTICLE IV.8 AS FORMULATIONS WHICH WORK IN CONCERT TO PRECLUDE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION WE HAD BEEN DISCUSSING. I CAME AWAY WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT THE WORD "DEPLOYED" IS A VERY KEY ONE FOR THE SOVIETS IN THE CONTEXT OF THEIR RECENT INITIATIVE TO ACCEPT THE WORD "TYPE."

JOURAVLEV TALKED AS IF THE SS-20 WERE ALREADY DEPLOYED. I COULD DRAW NO SUCH CONCLUSION ABOUT THE SS-16.
UNQUOTE

2. (ROWNY-BELETSKY, A-1577)

TELEMETRY
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BELETSKY IN EFFECT MADE A STATEMENT THAT U.S. WAS STTEMPTING TO DENY SOVIETS FREEDOM TO ADD OR CHANGE THEIR METHODS OF SUING AND IMPROVING THEIR TELEMETRY. HE SAID THAT IF A SYSTEM CAPABLE OF HANDLING AN "N" AMOUNT OF TELEMETRIC DATA WAS LATER FOUND TECHNOLOGICALLY INADEQUATE TO HANDLE INCREASED REQUIREMENTS, A NEW SYSTEM WITH INCREASED CAPACITY CAPABLE OF HANDLING (N PLUS X) WOULD BE REQUIRED. HE SAID HIS UNDERSTANDING OF U.S. PROPOSAL IS THAT THE TECHNOLOGICALLY SUPERIOR TELEMETRIC SYSTEMS WITH HIGHER DATA P PROCESSING CAPACITY WOULD BE FORBIDDEN. ROWNY TOLD BELETSKY HE MISUNDERSTOOD U.S. PROPOSAL. THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE IS THAT NO DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT IS TO BE PERMITTED AND THAT TELEMETRY IS NOT TO BE EXEMPTED FROM THIS OBLIGATION. IF A CAPAVITY OF "N" DID NOT INVOLVE DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT, THEN CERTAINLY THAT SYSTEM COULD BE EMPLOYED. LIKEWISE, IF "X" OR EVEN "Y"-CAPABLE SYSTEMS DID NOT INVOLVE DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT THERE WOULD BE NO REASON WHY THESE SYSTEMS COULD NOT BE DEVELOPED AND USED. BELETSKY CLAIMED NOT TO UNDERSTAND AND REPEATED THAT WE WERE INTRUDING INTO MATTERS THAT ARE PURELY OF INTERNAL NATURE.
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